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This paper reviews how digital technology, and the devices and broadband
networks associated with it (the Internet, for short), can be expected to
aect the ways in which books, music, the visual arts, libraries and archived
cultural heritage (cultural goods, for short) are produced, distributed and
consumed. The paper has four parts. First, I place the growth of the In-
ternet in historical and comparative perspective. I argue that the United
States is presently engaged in a regulatory eort similar in intent to those
imposed on earlier communications revolutions. In this context, I outline
the ways that the Internet can be expected to change how people produce
and consume cultural goods. I distinguish between practices the technology
makes possible and practices likely to become established as typical for the
majority of people. Second, I discuss some of the new arenas for cultural
policy thrown up by the Internet. I argue that, just as it has bound many
kinds of cultural content into a single medium, the Internet has tied together
a variety of regulatory issues and brought cultural policy into contact with
areas of policy-making not normally associated with culture. Third, I fo-
cus on the relationship between creativity, consumption and copyright law.
Fourth, I describe a number of key con
icts over the Internet's architecture
and content. How these are resolved through policy choices will have im-
portant consequences for how we consume and experience cultural goods of
all kinds in the future.Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 1
introduction
My desktop computer has more processing power, memory and storage space
than machines that ran the accounting and payroll departments of entire
corporations twenty years ago. This is an instance of Moore's Law, the
well-known rule which says that, for a xed amount of money, the amount
of computer processing power you can buy doubles every 18 months or so.
Moore's law was formulated in 1965 and has held true since the early 1970s.
It was one of the reasons that the futurists of thirty years ago were convinced
that digital technology would be a driving force for social change as the 21st
century approached.
Although the dierence in processing power between a new pc and a
comparably priced one from 1981 is enormous, this is not what really distin-
guishes them. The key dierence is that the older computer sat in a room by
itself; the new one can be connected around the clock to a global information
network. Whereas any well-informed computer user in the early 1980s could
have predicted how powerful computers were likely to be in 2001 in terms of
sheer speed, the rise of the Internet in the late 1990s took many people (not
to mention companies and governments) by surprise. In the early 1990s,
just before the sudden growth of the Web, the future of home computing
was supposed to be multimedia cd-roms. But beginning in 1995, from its
modest, non-commercial origins in academic and state institutions, the In-
ternet mushroomed into an open, heterogenous network of enormous scope
and variety. Technical advances in computing speed continued as expected
over the period, but the explosive growth rate of the Internet changed what
computing meant. For most users today, a computer without a connection
to the Internet seems hardly worth owning, no matter how powerful it is.
As it expanded, the Web took on an economic, social and cultural life
of its own. For a time, the economics of the Internet seemed to be break-
ing most of the established rules of business growth and development. The
volume of investment and speculation that surrounded Internet hardware,
software and service companies was simply remarkable. The \Great ipo
Rush of 1998" saw dozens of start-ups sprout out of the ground with noDigital Technology and Cultural Policy 2
products, no prots and huge net worth. Well-established Internet compa-
nies | meaning ones that were more than two years old | found themselves
valued as highly as some of the largest corporations in the world. A dening
moment of the boom came early in January of 1999, when Amazon's total
stock market value rose to more than $30 billion, making it worth more on
paper than Texaco.1
This investment boom happened, in part, because people were convinced
that the Internet was about to change how people did everything from com-
parison shopping to concert going. Social commentary on the Internet par-
alleled what was happening in the stock market. Predictions of revolution-
ary change abounded, along with extravagant extrapolations of uncertain
trends, from utopian fantasies to Orwellian nightmares. Now that the dot-
com boom has ended after four frenzied years, it should be easier to grasp
the social and cultural changes brought about by digital communications
and information technology.2
In this paper, I examine the implications of the Internet for the produc-
tion, distribution and consumption of cultural and expressive goods, broadly
dened. By this I mean literature, music, visual and performance arts, li-
braries, archives, and the like. The rise of the Internet has aected many
areas of life. It has allowed the growth of new ways to associate with others,
new ways to work and do business, new ways to be politically active, and
so on.3 So why focus on cultural goods? It turns out that one of the main
attractions of the Internet to ordinary users is its ability to deliver content
over the network quickly and at zero cost. Besides news stories, weather
reports and sports scores, cultural are much in demand. Music (in the form
1Doreen Carvajal, \Amazon Surge May Re
ect The New Math Of the Internet",
The New York Times January 11 (1999); Economist, \When the bubble bursts", The
Economist January 28th (1999).
2For the rest of the paper when I refer to \the Internet" or \the Web" it should be
taken to refer not only to the network itself but also to the panoply of digital technologies
and gadgets centered around it, like wireless networking, mp3 players, pdas, eBooks and
so on. These things are interesting (and challenging in the context of cultural policy)
mainly because they can tie themselves to or take advantage of services provided through
the wider network.
3For a wide-ranging review of the Internet's social impact, see Paul DiMaggio etal.,
\Social Implications of the Internet", Annual Review of Sociology (Forthcoming).Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 3
of mp3 les) has been the most visibly exchanged item so far. But video
is not too far o, with literature, images of all kinds and archival materials
also very common. In the past year or so, it has become obvious that the In-
ternet's technical capacity to move these goods around does not mesh easily
with established legal practice, government policy or commercial interests.
This makes cultural goods interesting and important. Shopping online
may be more convenient than going to the mall, but the underlying trans-
action is the same. Running a project using email and versioning software
may allow a manager to be more ecient, but the company need not change
its business model. But being able to search for and freely download a novel,
a few hours of music, or an entire movie is both immediately appealing to
many people and completely incompatible with how many corporations and
artists now make their money. So although the Internet's eects are mani-
fold, it is in the sphere of cultural goods that digital technology is putting
the most pressure on established ways of doing things. The potential for
change is very great here, as is the resistance of entrenched parties.
It is therefore time to think carefully about the relationship between
technical change and the social organization of cultural production. It is no
longer plausible to think that the Internet will sweep away existing institu-
tions simply by virtue of its technical characteristics, or that it will escape
political and legal regulation because of its novelty. At the same time, stan-
dard ways of making, selling and consuming books, music or art cannot go
on as if the Internet did not exist. Neither can those involved in these ar-
eas simply assimilate the new medium without changing themselves. This
means that the important issue is not whether technology will overwhelm us
(or vice versa) but how the new technologies and existing institutions will
in
uence one another. Rather than expecting the future to inevitably roll
over us, we should think about how policy makers might help reshape the
social organization of cultural goods.
The technological changes of the last few years helped bring into focus
central concerns in the eld of cultural policy. Discussions of cultural pol-
icy in the United States have sometimes been quite narrowly focused (e.g.,
whether and how the government should fund the arts) or re
exive (e.g.,Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 4
whether there is such a thing as cultural policy at all). The rise of the
Internet has done a great deal to bring questions of cultural policy to the
forefront of public discourse. How will literature, music and lm be pro-
duced and made available to people? How will people's tastes change as
their choices do? How accessible will cultural goods be, and how protable?
Will a bountiful cultural heritage, presently stored in museums, libraries and
archives, be made more easily available to a much wider audience, or will
it come under tight corporate control? How much of our common heritage
will be locked away under copyright restrictions, and how will that aect the
production of culture? How much censorship will be built into the system?
How will local and national cultures be changed?
Questions proliferate. The general point is that cultural consumption
is already a large part of what the Internet is used for. The ways the
technology is built and regulated will have an immediate and deep impact
on how people read, listen, view and learn. The Internet binds all kinds of
content together in a common digital medium, which means that historically
separate activities and organizations now face similar policy issues about
audiences, access, archiving, censorship, distribution, property, and pricing.
As it gets built, the digital communications network undergirding these
processes will have assumptions and regulations about all of them built into
its code.4
The paper is divided into four parts. First, I put the growth of the
Internet in historical and theoretical context. I show how its trajectory and
impact resemble the eects of previous communications revolutions in many
ways, even though its potential scope is wider in the long run. The historical
lessons are that new technologies are adapted to social uses in complex ways,
and that the myths that grow up around new technologies in their early days
are not good guides to their long-run impact. With this historical context
in mind, I discuss some of the ways that the Internet is changing the world
of cultural goods. Second, I argue that the concerns of cultural policy have
expanded as a consequence of the new technologies. I lay out a number of
these new policy areas. Third, I describe how questions of authorship and
4Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, (New York: Basic Books, 2000).Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 5
copyright raise serious issues in almost every area of cultural policy. Fourth,
I pick out some specic substantive tensions in the area of cultural policy
that are likely to persist and demand attention for the foreseeable future.
technology and social change
In this section I compare the growth of the Internet to previous communica-
tions revolutions, with an eye to highlighting their similarities. I show how
common patterns of development appear across cases. Typically, as a com-
munications technology emerges, people nd it mysterious. Those who use
the new technology nd themselves objects of attention from a curious pub-
lic. Later, stable conventions of use grow up in the wider population, though
the underlying organization of the technology may still be quite 
uid. Then
serious eorts at regulation begin. Specic outcomes vary with regard to
pricing, business structure, typical use, network openness, and so on. In the
case of the Internet, we are quickly moving into a regulatory phase where
serious choices about the architecture of the network will be made.
How big a revolution?
How much has the Internet aected people's lives in the few years since
it began to grow beyond its original bounds? It is undeniable that it has
already changed the way many people communicate with each other, how
they organize their lives, how they work, how they consume. In 1995 only
three percent of Americans had ever used the Internet.5 Five years later,
about 83 million Americans were regularly online, 56 million of whom used
the net to shop.6
Such rapid change at the level of individual users should be placed in
historical and social context. Histories of the Internet show that it had a
long incubation period before bursting on the world. The Internet grew
5Pew Research Center for People & the Press, Technology in the American Household,
1995 hURL: www.people-press.org/tech.htmi { visited on April 9th 2001.
6IntelliQuest, IntelliQuest study shows 83 million U.S. internet users and 56 million
online shoppers, 1999 hURL: intelliquest.com/press/release78.htmi { visited on April
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up as a fortuitous and unexpected consequence of government-sponsored
research, where the researchers were left more or less to themselves for cru-
cial periods.7 The seeds of its growth were planted in universities and the
Defense Department in the 1950's, and by the late 1970's nearly all of the
core technical ideas were in place. Looking back even further, the rise of
the Internet can be place in the context of ongoing trends in American soci-
ety. Economic historians have traced the growth of distributed information
and communications networks in the U.S. back to the founding of the Post
Oce.8 On this view, the U.S. has been an information society for a very
long time, and processes that might seem unique to the Internet have been
at work in other communications networks (such as those constituted by
the postal service, railroads, telegraph and radio) over the past 150 years
or so. Research like this is a good antidote to futuristic hype. It does not
dismiss the Internet's impact, but does show that the Web does not mark
an unprecedented rupture with the past.
It took a little longer than expected for the promised economic benets of
digital technology to register in standard measures. Economists pointed out
that the rise of computers in the workplace did not seem to have any impact
on productivity statistics.9 For most of the 1990s, there was no measurable
macro-economic of investment in information technology on productivity,
even though businesses had been spending money on computers and com-
munications for some time. This non-nding was puzzling given all the talk
of an information society. But recent research has found computers to be
responsible for an increasingly large percentage of productivity growth since
the 1980s.10 Economically, it looks increasingly as though the spread of com-
7Janet Abbate, Inventing the Internet, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Katie
Hafner and Matthew Lyon, Where wizards stay up late: the origins of the Internet, (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
8Alfred D. Chandler and James W. Cortada, eds., A Nation Transformed by Informa-
tion, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
9Erik Brynjolfsson, \The Productivity Paradox of Information Technology", Commu-
nications of the ACM 36 (1993).
10Stephen D. Oliner and Daniel E. Sichel, \The Resurgence of Growth in the Late
1990s: Is Information Technology the Story?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 Winter
(2000), no. 4.Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 7
puters counts as an important structural shift in the macro-economy.11 The
Internet is the latest wave of digital \informationalization." What eect will
it have in the sphere of arts and culture? The historical continuities suggest
that comparisons with earlier communications revolutions will be useful.
Early experimentation
People experiment with new technologies to nd out what they can do, and
to gure out ways of integrating them into their lives. Several communica-
tions technologies have been put to work in ways that, in retrospect, appear
strange, misguided or merely quaint. The telephone, for instance, was ini-
tially used in some areas as a broadcast medium for music (more like a
radio) rather than as a means of person-to-person communication. Other
inventions inspired even odder responses. Carolyn Marvin's study of the
early days of electricity reproduces some photographs of New York society
ladies posing in dresses lined with electric light-bulbs and wires.12 This way
of incorporating technology into everyday life was driven by fashion. What
mattered was not the technology as such, but rather its novelty.
Hobbyists experiment with technology to a dierent end. They want
to nd out what it is capable of. In the process, they have a tendency to
build exclusive communities for themselves, closed to those who lack the
practical knowledge to work the equipment or speak the jargon. Again with
19th century technology, Marvin shows how the spread of electric lighting
and the telegraph was accompanied by professional and popular eorts to
distinguish between those who knew how things worked and those whose
role was merely to look on in awe. Sharp distinctions were drawn between
competent and incompetent users, usually re
ecting and reinforcing existing
gender, racial and class-based stereotypes.13 The history of radio broadcast-
ing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries shows a similar pattern. Radio
enthusiasts (almost all young men) built a community whose members were
11J. Bradford DeLong, Do we have a \New" Macroeconomy? 2001 hURL: www.
j-bradford-delong.neti { visited on April 3rd 2001.
12Carolyn Marvin, When Old Technologies were New: Thinking about electric commu-
nication in the late nineteenth century, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
13Marvin, When Old Technologies were New, ibid.Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 8
were proled in the popular press for their ability to control the mysterious
ether, communicate with one another over great distances, and even listen in
on other people's conversations.14 The parallels to the early days of home
computing and the Internet are clear.15 The home-computer enthusiasts
of the 1970s, the teenage hackers of the 1980s, and the architects of Open
Source software in the 1990s have all generated their own myths, exclusivist
cultures and individual heroes in much the same way.16
Artists pick up on new technology in a way that positions them some-
where between the hobbyists and the fashion victims. They may quickly
become sophisticated and creative users of new technologies; but at the
same time art inspired by and produced during the early phases of a new
technology is often quite ephemeral. Artists have used computers almost
since they became available to the public.17 Our cultural sensibilities about
digital technology are more deeply rooted than they might appear, and a
\technological aesthetic" has existed in some form or other since the 19th
century.18 The Internet has precipitated a dizzying variety of artistic ex-
perimentation, much of it using the new medium to comment on the very
changes the technology is thought to be bringing about. Artists have often
focused on the increasingly close meshing of humans and machines, the fear
of surveillance, the ubiquity of information, and anxiety about intelligent
computers, amongst other themes.19
14Susan Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899-1922, (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1994).
15Eszter Hargittai, \Radio's lessons for the Internet", Communications of the ACM 41
(2000).
16Glyn Moody, Rebel Code: Linux and the Open Source Revolution, (New York: Perseus,
2001); Steven Levy, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution, (New York: Penguin,
2001); Steven Segaller, Nerds 2.0.1: A Brief History of the Internet, (TV Books, Inc,
1999).
17Timothy Druckrey, ed., Ars Electronica: Facing the Future: A Survey of Two
Decades, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
18N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics,
Literature, and Informatics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Robert Rut-
sky, High Techne: Art and Technology from the Machine Aesthetic to the Posthuman
Condition, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
19Mark Dery, Escape Velocity: cyberculture at the end of the century, (New York: Grove
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I say more below about how digital technology has been used in dierent
forms of art. For now, however, I just want to emphasize that the art
springing up around computers and the Internet seems similar in spirit to
other movements in the past. Modern art in general bears the marks of
20th century technology, and has sometimes taken technologically driven
social change explicitly as a theme, as with the Italian Futurists. As a rule,
however, contemporary art movements that tie themselves to specic pieces
of technology tend to date very quickly. (This was the fate of Futurism and
its love of the automobile.) There is an extraordinary variety of artistic
content on and about the Web (or both). But most of it is unlikely to have
any long-term signicance. This is true both for new cultural practices as
well as cultural goods. The historical evidence suggests that the more exotic
Internet communities | technopagans, cyborgs, posthumans, cyberpunks
and the rest | are likely to be seen more as products of their time than
avatars of the future. There may not be that much distance between them
and the society ladies who dressed in light-bulbs.
This does not mean that the work of these artists is uninteresting, just
that it is probably an unreliable guide to what lies ahead. Although it should
be clear that artists and audiences relate to the new digital technology in
dierent ways, it is surprising how often the creative and experimental work
of artists in a new medium is taken as an indication of how the future
will look for most users in short order. But the technical capabilities and
expressive possibilities of communications media are almost always wider
than the routine uses to which they are eventually put.
Conventions and habitual use
When confronted with a new technology we ask \What is this for?" and
\How does it t in to my life?" New technologies slowly become familiar
ones; novel tasks eventually become habitual; innovative practices become
conventional. This process is a complex one. The more versatile and general
the innovation, the less obvious the process of adaptation will be, and the
more options there will be to select from.Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 10
Conventions are shared expectations about how someone should act or
something should work. They include such things as what you normally say
when you answer the phone, what you expect to hear when you switch on
the radio or turn on your computer. Conventions may be built in by design
(in which case they are standards) or emerge through experimentation or
trial and error. As conventions of use become xed, so do assumptions about
a technology and its proper uses.
Claude Fischer's social history of the telephone is an excellent example.20
Fischer shows how Americans gradually integrated phone use into everyday
life, guring out dierent uses for it, deciding what was and was not appro-
priate, and so on. This process ranged from deciding what one said when
answering the phone (\Ahoy!" was an early contender), to experimenting
with the phone as a way of broadcasting music, to discovering it could be
more than a business tool. The technology of the telephone network proved
itself adaptable to many dierent kinds of conventional standards, and it is
clear from the historical record that the ones that became well-established
were not superior to the alternatives in any obvious sense.
As a technology becomes a familiar part of life, it can have knock-on
eects on other social practices. Individuals and organizations may change
in response to it. Wolfgang Schivelbusch's study the rise of gas and elec-
tric lighting shows the many ways this can happen. As articial lighting
became more widespread in cities throughout the 18th and 19th centuries,
the modern idea of urban night life developed along with it. The modern
shop window took shape as a well-lit display of what was available inside,
though the store was closed in the evenings. The experience of going to the
theater changed, too. In the 18th century the audience was as well lit as
the performers on stage; the advent of electric spotlights in the 19th century
showed up cheap backdrops and prompted the design of more naturalistic
sets. Even ideas about the city's relationship to the countryside changed,
as rural areas became a place for peple to escape the city lights (and vice
20Claude S. Fischer, America Calling: A Social History of the Telephone to 1940, (Berke-
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versa).21 Again, it is unhelpful to think of the technology as determining
these changes. They developed through reciprocal cycles of innovation and
sense-making.
A similar process is taking place today as users graually become more
familiar with digital technology and the Internet. A solid core of user con-
vention already exists. Some of it is built into computer operating systems
and graphical user environments; some exists as rules of \netiquette" for
online interaction; some as search strategies for locating information. At
all these levels, users are not simply learning what the technology is for,
they are deciding what it is for. Often, users will put a technology to use
in an unexpected way. In many countries, for instance, the cell phone net-
work is used for text messaging almost as much as for voice communication,
and a specialized shorthand language has developed out of this practice. Of
course, users are not guaranteed to choose the most interesting, productive
or ecient use for a technology. In the corporate world, a great deal of com-
puter time is taken up producing slide-based presentations. Managers and
executives now spend a good deal of time preparing elaborate Power-Point
slide shows, perhaps to no great productive eect. Each new version of this
software adds new capabilities, allowing expectations to rise further. This
now common use of pcs would likely amaze many of those who pioneered
personal computing 20 years ago.
Conventions are not dictated by engineering or instituted by law, and
they are thus perhaps the hardest area for policy makers to aect. But they
have a great deal of force. The force of conventions are clearest when they
are absent or ignored. Most of us know the frustration of being unable to
carry out a simple task on a computer because the menu item is not where
we expect it to be, or of having spammers abuse email. The disadvantages
of convention appear when we want to change or challenge an established
routine or practice. Conventions can calcify over time, leaving designers
and users little choice but to follow an established rule, no matter how
inane. Computer interface designers continuously struggle with this prob-
21Wolfgang Schivelbusch, Disenchanted Night: the industrialization of light in the nine-
teenth century, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 12
lem.22 The kind of knock-on eects we saw in the historical examples apply
here as well. Interface design embeds assumptions about users and uses into
hardware and software that may constrain as much as they enable.23
All of this means we should think carefully about what users are coming
to take for granted about digital technology, and how this is happening. In
the case of cultural goods, we can ask whether arts administrators really
want people to get used to the idea of clicking their way through online
exhibitions instead of visiting galleries or downloading music for free. Sim-
ilarly, do university deans really want online classes and distance learning
courses? In many ways, conventions and expectations can be hard to make
policy about, because they often emerge from the ground up. But (as adver-
tisers are well aware) the assumptions of some users may be easier to shape
than others. ZapMe, for example, is a company that provides computers to
schools for free in return for being allowed to collect marketing data from
children and then \zap" them with advertisements as they use the pcs. We
can ask if this is the sort of trade-o we would like to see become standard.
Convention and habitual use are important for policy because they are
the main ways that peoples' expectations about a technology begin to so-
lidify. We expect previews at the cinema but not at the opera; we accept
full-page advertisements in magazines but not in novels; we plan to pay for
some television shows but not others. These assumptions imply diering
business models and organizational structures. The Internet can be made
to look or sound like all existing media, or it can be something quite dierent
from any of them. Thus, the conventions and expectations that users settle
on will have important consequences for content-providers of all kinds.
Institutions and regulation
Beyond practical conventions of use lies the world of infrastructural design
and regulation by the state, the market and the law. Rules laid down here
22Jef Raskin, The Humane Interface: New Directions for Designing Interactive Systems,
(New York: Addison-Wesley, 2000).
23Steven Johnson, Interface Culture: How New Technology Transforms the Way We
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will determine what is possible for the majority of new users, particularly as
more and more come on stream who have no knowledge of, or interest in, how
the underlying technology actually works. Radio is again analogous to the
Internet here. By 1920, this initially anarchic, egalitarian medium had con-
solidated commercially and come under government regulation. The state
sliced up the broadcast spectrum and allocated it to dierent uses. Ham
radio operators were relegated to a small part of the available bandwidth.
The industry's way of making money changed, too. Companies had started
o selling radio sets to consumers; they ended up selling consumers to ad-
vertisers by providing entertainment to listeners.24 The \interactivity" of
radio thus declined and the character of the medium changed.
Commercial and regulatory eorts run deeper than simple convention
because they involve choices about architecture and infrastructure. The In-
ternet got o to a lucky start in this respect. The packets of information
traveling through it are all seen by the network as being equally important
(unlike the postal network), so when there is congestion it aects everyone.
There is no billing mechanism built into the network (unlike the phone sys-
tem), so it's possible to use the network for free. In principle anyone can
publish their work very easily (unlike print and broadcast media) and have
their Website be as accessible as anyone else's. The protocols that shut-
tle data back and forth across the Web are open and inter-operable. The
end-user need know nothing of the many dierent hardware and software
platforms that comprise the network. Taken as a whole, the Internet's in-
frastructure was designed to be robust and damage-tolerant (again, unlike
phone or broadcast networks). And its ability to carry all kinds of data
meant that it had the potential to be a kind of superset of every other
communications medium.
Because of these characteristics, the early days of the Internet's expan-
sion brought with them much social commentary telling us how the Web
was about to sweep away the old regime, both in general and with specic
reference to the arts and culture industry.25 The pendulum swung back
24Hargittai, Radio's lessons for the Internet, ibid.
25Esther Dyson, Release 2.0: a design for living in the digital age, 1st ed.. (New York:Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 14
quickly, however, as dystopian visions emerged to compete with the utopian
ones.26 But it is clear by now that technology, by itself, is not going to
determine the shape of the future either way. It is not even going to deter-
mine its own shape. Many of its central features could easily be regulated,
legislated or competed out of existence. As we shall see below, this is true
of inter-operability, open standards, anonymity, and many other features of
the Internet that once seemed to dene the medium.
The historical record should make this unsurprising, but the belief that
the Internet is somehow immune to these social and political forces is quite
persistent. This is especially true in the hacker community, where it has
taken on a strong libertarian tinge.27 But the amount of corporate invest-
ment in the Internet, together with the public interest issues that it raises,
mean that hardware and software developers can no longer pretend that they
live outside of society. It is not whether there will be regulation, but what
kind.28 The Internet carries cultural content to people, in many forms. How
it is designed and regulated will have an immediate eect on the production,
distribution and consumption of that content.
Technology and cultural goods
How are these processes of experimentation, habituation and regulation af-
fecting how artists, composers and writers work? From a sociological per-
spective, the production of art is a collective activity. Artists work in an
environment with established standards and expectations that make it pos-
sible to produce art and have an audience for it.29 Artists have always
Broadway Books, 1997); Michael Dertouzos, What Will Be: How the New World of In-
formation Will Change Our Lives, (New York: Harper Business, 1997); V. A. Shiva, Arts
and the Internet: a guide to the revolution, (New York: Allworth Press, 1996).
26Simson Garnkel, Database Nation, (Cambridge, MA: O'Reilly and Associates, 2000);
Andrew L. Shapiro and Richard C. Leone, The Control Revolution: How The Internet is
Putting Individuals in Charge and Changing the World We Know, (Public Aairs, 1999).
27The irony is that this libertarian culture was fostered in university computer science
departments and nanced by the government. This sometimes gets acknowledged in the
community. A recent post on slashdot.org complained that the attitude of many hackers
toward both government and investors was \Go away and give me more money."
28Lessig, Code, ibid.
29Howard Becker, Artworlds, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 15
experimented with new materials and techniques and will continue to do
so. Howard Becker's work makes it clear that artists who try to use new
technologies always run into some trouble with existing material culture,
organizational practices and cultural expectations. He cites the example of
an artist who made a sculpture out of heavy steel machinery which had been
salvaged from a factory. The artist was able to produce the work and have it
accepted for exhibition by a gallery. But when it was delivered, the curator
found that it would not t through the doorway. This was probably just as
well, because the sculpture was so heavy that it would have fallen through
the gallery 
oor had it gotten inside. Becker's point is that assumptions
about what art is are not merely cognitive. They are literally built in to
the working environment of artworlds. So when new technologies appear,
we should not think the problem is one of fusty traditionalists resisting new
ideas, but rather as an instance of the interplay of technology and social
practice that I have been emphasizing.
Visual artists are experimenting with the Internet and \virtual environ-
ments" of dierent kinds.30 Recent art exhibitions (such as BitStreams at
the Whitney and 010101 at the San Francisco moma) perhaps signal the
emergence of digital art as a serious medium.31 The practice of musical com-
position has been changed by digital technology, too. Software applications
for scoring, sequencing and mixing music have altered the work environment
of composers. For many composers, the gap between writing music and hear-
ing it for the rst time has been compressed. Comparatively cheap digital
recording equipment has made high-quality sound-engineering and produc-
tion faster and easier. And innovations in instrument design have changed
the sonic possibilities open both to musicians and composers.32 In the case
30Mary Moser and Douglas McLeod, eds., Immersed in Technology: Art in Virtual
Environments, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).
31There is a distinction between digital art and digitized art. The Whitney's BitStreams
exhibition is an example of the former. Here, digital technology was an artistic medium.
A \virtual gallery" of old masters at, say, the Smithsonian Museum of American Art's
Website is an example of the latter. It treats digital technology as a communications
medium. Digitized art raises questions about the dierences between seeing a painting
hanging in a gallery and seeing a reproduction of it displayed on a computer screen.
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of writing, word processing software diused very quickly, and changed the
way that many authors produced and revised their work. The eects of
word processors on the content of writing are less clear, but it does seem
that the experience of composing text on a word processor is quite dierent
from writing longhand.33
Two specic developments in book publishing are of great interest. First,
on-demand book production is now economically viable (using what are es-
sentially high-quality photocopying/binding machines). The main use of
this technology at present is keeping specialist books (like academic mono-
graphs) in print, though in the long term they may have wider commerical
applications.34 In the wider market, e-books are becoming more common
thanks to the arrival of relatively cheap, high-quality viewing hardware.
One potential eect of e-books on literary production is to reintroduce the
novella as a commercially viable literary format. Unlike paper books, there
is essentially no dierence in production cost between a seventy page and a
seven hundred page e-book.
The argument that computers signal the death of books and book-
reading has also resurfaced recently. Some commentators on this topic,
such as Sven Birkerts, are careful about how, exactly, they see the culture
of books being changed by computers.35 But others oer little more than
a nostalgia bordering on fetishism for the world of leather-bound volumes
and pure cotton paper | a perfect example of how entrenched expectations
about the experience of culture can lead to a backlash against new technolo-
(Wesleyan University Press, 1999).
33The research literature on this point is not large. But experiments conrm the intu-
ition that using a word processor changes how texts get revised. There is some evidence
that, when revising a document written with a word processor, authors may make more
frequent but less substantial revisions than when they write longhand. See E. Joram etal.,
\The eects of revising with a word-processor on written composition", Research in the
Teaching of English 26 (1992), no. 2.
34For an exchange on this development, see Niko Pfund and Michael Groseth, \Frus-
trated Authors: We can help you..." The Chronicle of Higher Education XLVII March
29th (2001), no. 29 and Michael J. Bugeja, \...But Make Sure You Read the Fine Print",
The Chronicle of Higher Education XLVII March 29th (2001).
35Sven Birkerts, The Gutenberg Elegies: the fate of reading in an electronic age, (New
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gies.36 Such views also carry a strong whi of elitism. Harold Bloom uses
Microsoft's eBook to read a potboiler by Michael Crichton. His contempt
for the novel makes it easier to dislike the technology. When he extols the
virtues of printed books, however, he thinks only of Shakespeare, Montaigne
and Jane Austen.37 It turns out that announcements of the death of the
book (and of reading itself, and a fortiori of civilization in general) have
consistently appeared with every major transformation of book production,
such as that from manuscript to print, print to newsprint, and cloth binding
to mass-market paperbacks.38
Digital technology does not just change how familiar cultural goods are
produced, it also provides the raw material for new genres. Computer gam-
ing, for instance, is one area where signicant developments are likely. We
do not normally think of computer games as serious cultural goods. At
the moment, the market for computer games is largely limited to particu-
lar demographic groups | mainly young men. This focus has had strong
implications for software design, as a glance at the games available in your
local store will quickly reveal.39 But the game industry is beginning to turn
out titles of increasing depth and sophistication whose appeal does not de-
pend on the \gee-whiz" aspect of the technology or the preoccupations of
adolescent boys.40 We can make an analogy to computer animated lms.
The earliest eorts in this medium focused mainly on stretching the tech-
nology to its limits, rendering complex lighting eects or dicult textures
like skin and hair. Things have now reached a stage where a lm's purely
technical features do not dominate the experience of viewing it. This has
happened partly because the genre has matured, and lm makers try to
avoid its clich es. But audiences have also become much more familiar with
36Willam Gass, \In defense of the book", Harper's November (1999).
37Harold Bloom, \On rst looking into Gate's Crichton", The New York Times June
4th (2000).
38For historical context see the essays in Georey Nunberg, ed., The Future of the
Book, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
39Jane Fountain, \Constructing the information society: women, information technol-
ogy and design", Technology in Society 22 (2000).
40A recent example is Black & White, a complex and innovative game that received
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computer animation, and so can read its conventions without thinking about
them. Computer games are likely to follow a similar line of development.
Those who advocate ratings and censorship rules for these games already
think that the genre is developing along the same lines as the cinema. Other
markers of a well-dened, legitimate cultural good (an adult audience, seri-
ous critics, a market for classics, and so on) are also visible. This trend is
likely to become more marked as people who grew up with game consoles
in their bedrooms get older and more auent.
It is dicult to be specic about the long-term eects of new technology
on artistic production. Almost by denition, we cannot say what artists
or other cultural producers are likely to come up with, or what the long-
term value of works made using new media will be.41 As with any medium,
however, the chances are high that work judged to be original and important
will be produced sooner or later.42 A historical perspective shows that this
kind of innovation happens all the time.43 We should not think that every
experimental work involving digital technology heralds a revolution in art.
But neither should we be tempted to slip into a narrative of decline simply
because we cannot yet point to acknowledged masterpieces.
new arenas for cultural policy
At the beginning of the 1990s, the policy questions posed by the Internet
were often thought of as abstract dichotomies that would be resolved by the
technology itself. In the past few years, things have become more concrete.
We now face many specic infrastructure issues, organizational problems,
legal cases, and political initiatives. As we shall see, the most bitter legal
and political con
icts directly concern the ownership and distribution of
cultural goods.
41For further discussion see Sean Cubitt, Digital Aesthetics, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage,
1999) and Steven Holtzman, Digital Mosaics: The Aesthetics of Cyberspace, (Touchstone
Books, 1998).
42Margot Lovejoy, Postmodern Currents: Art and Artists in the Age of Electronic Media,
(New York: Pentice Hall, 1996).
43Michael Rush, New Media in Late 20th-Century Art, (Thames & Hudson, 1999).Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 19
I begin with the problem of attracting the attention of Internet users.
(From the users' point of view, the problem is guring out what to pay
attention to.) I speculate a little about the role of arts organizations in a
world of information overload, suggesting that their old role as arbiters of
taste might reappear in a positive new way. The problem of attention-getting
and ltering leads directly on to the question of censorship. The censoring
of controversial art is a common issue in cultural policy; it takes on new
dimensions when the availability of culture over the Internet is considered.
Gradually broadening the focus, I sketch the issues surrounding inequality
of access to the Web, and then (in the next section) move on to a discussion
of copyright and intellectual property. My main aim is to show how specic
issues in cultural policy are implicated in much wider debates.
Finding an audience; searching for content
In 1995, Nicholas Negroponte presented an upbeat vision of the future in
his book Being Digital.44 One of the main benets of the new information
technologies, in his view, was that they enabled the collection of precise
data on the habits, preferences and practices of individual users. Think
of the parts of the Sunday New York Times that you automatically throw
away. With perfect information about your habits, the Times could instead
tailor its product to individual users | perhaps I want sports scores (but no
baseball), foreign news (but no business reports), for example. I would not
have to wade through unwanted information, and the Times would not have
to waste money providing me with content I pay no attention to. Negroponte
called this idea the \Daily Me". He meant it to be liberating: people would
nally have the freedom to consume what they wanted.
Readers today are more likely to be ambivalent about the idea of a \Daily
Me" than Negroponte was six years ago. For one thing, the prospect of pri-
vate corporations holding huge amounts of personal data on every consumer
is not very attractive.45 Precisely targeted content can be accompanied (or
44Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital, (New York: Knopf, 1995).
45Garnkel, Database Nation, ibid.; A. M. Froomkin, \The death of privacy?" Stanford
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replaced) by precisely targeted advertising. One of the few assets a bankrupt
dot-com has is its customer database, and since the investment bubble burst
these have often been up for sale, whatever the original privacy policy might
have said.46 But even if we could make sure that our personal information
would not be abused, there are still good reasons to worry about the \Daily
Me". Cass Sunstein recently made a comprehensive attack on the idea of
perfectly customized consumption.47 His argument is that the Internet has
the capacity to make us more extreme in our views and less tolerant of other
people precisely because it allows individuals to specify in advance what they
want to see, hear and read. Unless we believe that each individual's prefer-
ences are xed forever, it is surely restricting and potentially harmful to be
able to block out new ideas and experiences so easily.
Sunstein is mainly concerned about the eects of the Internet on democ-
racy. But the point he makes is as relevant to arts participation as it is to
politics. Audience development is one of the main tasks of any arts orga-
nization, and on the face of it the Internet provides new and exciting ways
to attract people to the arts. One might think, for example, that build-
ing a quality website would open up an arts organization to a much larger
audience. Sunstein's arguments suggest the opposite might happen, or at
least that the eects might be minimal. It would be a nasty irony if the
main result of the digital communications revolution was to make people
less likely hear about or try out new things. Sunstein's own remedy for
the problem of political diversity requires government regulation. He argues
that the state should help create \Town Halls" where people can debate
various issues, and that political websites should be required to link to sites
espousing alternative views. Beyond that, search engines and portal-sites
(like Yahoo) might be required to provide links to nonprot or political sites
on their front page.
It is easy to see what similar remedies in the area of arts policy might
look like. The government might require a certain amount of cultural content
46Greg Sandoval, Failed dot-coms may be selling your private information, 2000 hURL:
www.cnet.com/news/0-1007-200-2176430.htmli { visited on April 30th, 2001.
47Cass Sunstein, Republic.com, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 21
relative to all material on a particular site, for example. Whether or not this
approach is a good idea is another matter. Television programming aimed at
children is required to have a minimum level of educational content, a policy
most people favor. But government regulation of arts programming in this
way seems paternalistic. And the idea of \required linking" dispenses with
the idea of the Internet as an open network. The issue is a complex one.
Sunstein is right to suggest that a steady diet of things you have already tried
is likely to be bad for you (and bad for civil society) in the long run. Arts
administrators, trying hard to get people into performances and exhibitions
of new work, are likely to agree. But Negroponte is not entirely mistaken:
there is simply too much information out there to evaluate. To make use of
the Web properly, people must of necessity be very selective.
The selection mechanism itself is very important. There are four main
varieties. Mega-portals, like Yahoo, aim to cover the entire Web. They
have the greatest scope and by far the largest amount of trac, but also
the greatest potential for channeling content in narrow ways.48 (To be fair,
portal sites can also sustain communities interested in very specic topics, as
Yahoo does with its Groups system.) Magazine format sites work like print
magazines, bringing specic, pre-selected items, written by freelance writers.
Online magazines can easily link to external sites, and can also support
discussion groups. Slate (slate.com) is a good example of this model. User-
driven sites like Kuro5hin [sic] (kuro5hin.org) get all their content from their
users and relying on a moderation system (which I will describe below) to
organize the material. Sites like Plastic (plastic.com) are trying to blend
this approach with the Slate-style format. Finally, organizations always have
the option to build their own site or network of sites, in the hope that users
will nd their way to it and stay. In this case, the trick is setting up the site
in a way that allows a community of users to form around it, rather than
treating it solely as a brochure or shop.49
48Eszter Hargittai, \Open Portals or Closed Gates: Channeling Content on the World
Wide Web", Poetics 27 (2000), no. 4.
49Amy Jo Kim, Community-building on the Web: Secret strategies for successful online
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In Negroponte's vision, the technology would be perfectly transparent
and pliant to each user. Things have not turned out so smoothly. Many
users depend on the search engine they use. If a website is not in a search
engine's database, then it will eectively be unavailable to users (assuming
they do not know of its existence in advance). This is not the kind of
system that Negroponte had in mind. But as an increasing proportion of
Internet trac is concentrated on a very small number of portals, those
portals are in a position to shape what the Web looks like to most users.50
The archetype here is America Online, which prefers its customers to use its
aol browser rather than Netscape or Internet Explorer. In this browsing
environment, the na ve user might easily think the Internet is part of a suite
of services oered by aol rather than a vast network that exists outside of it.
Here the problem is not hyper-specialization, but its opposite | users who
search exclusively through mega-portals and are all subject to the whatever
selectivity, search-blindness or bias the portal might suer from.
If the choice is between \self-selection" on the part of users and \search-
blindness" courtesy of the Web portals, we would probably want to choose
the former. But these might not be the only options. A number of Internet
sites have community-based, user-controllable moderation systems built in
to them, and they work quite well. The idea is that registered users have a
certain number of points (often called \karma" or something similar) which
they use to mark articles, posts or notices as worth reading or not. Each
contribution to the site (an article, op-ed piece or news item, say) carries a
score that is the sum total of all user moderations on it. So for example,
an article may score anything from -1 to +5. Users choose the moderation
level they want to browse at | say, +2 | and then see only contributions
with that score or higher. Users can earn karma by posting items themselves
judged to be of good quality.
This sort of moderation system has been used for some time on \geek"
sites such as Slashdot (slashdot.org) and Kuro5hin. It has several advan-
50J. Waxman, The old 80/20 rule takes one on the jaw: Internet trends report 1999
review, (San Francisco: Alexa Research, 2000); J. Waxman, Leading the Pack... Internet
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tages. It allows users to lter content by attributed quality; community
standards emerge from the aggregation of individual votes; users do not
have to vote on every story; participation is rewarded with karma; and
nothing is really censored, because you can always choose to browse at -1
and see everything.51 Moderation systems are also to be found on sites such
as Plastic (plastic.com) which focus on arts and culture and aim to have a
broad appeal.
All kinds of moderation systems are possible. They vary in the degree
to which they require an active community of participants prepared to put
the time into moderating posts. They are not a panacea | they can do
nothing to address the problems associated with searching the Internet as
a whole, for instance. Instead they work as ways to reduce the noise on a
site that many users are contributing to all the time. But if many of these
users are scanning dierent bits of the Web and submitting stories to the
community site, and the moderation system in turn sorts and ranks those
stories for users, then the community as a whole can function as a powerful
distributed system that collects, processes and evaluates information and
promotes discussion.
The needs of users are too varied for any one approach to work in every
case. The more general lesson, though, is that the combination of informa-
tion glut and portal concentration is an excellent reason to look again at
the role of foundations and arts organizations as gatekeepers and lterers
of cultural content. Because it is so dicult to choose what to focus on,
an organization that helps you make that choice by taking on the burden of
sorting and ranking what was available is very useful. Again, details matter.
Carrying out this process through a community of users, a service provided
by a sta, or some special-purpose network of linked organizations would
make a dierence to the outcome. A main function of these organizations
in the past was to exclude forms of art (and people) rather than include
them. But things are now at a point where exclusivity is necessary in order
to process the range of choices at all.
51Choosing to see everything posted on a site like Slashdot will quickly convince one of
(a) the reality of information glut, and (b) the need for some kind of ltering system.Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 24
The interesting question is how dierent approaches to searching and
ltering will mesh with society-wide patterns in the stratication of taste
and information access. One possibility is that being an omnivore will sim-
ply become a specialized market niche in itself, and remain the preserve of
those with the time or money to have such tastes, and the skill to nd ways
to specify their preferences online. Some Websites already cater to such
people. In the longer term, this approach might benet a small minority
of sophisticated users. Meanwhile, the majority (voluntarily or by default)
might end up using the Internet via the mega-portals, in an essentially pas-
sive and broadcast-based way. They might then be subject to a bastardized
version of Negroponte's \Daily Me" based on marketing data collected from
browser cookies as they surf | a kind of \Daily Sell". A more optimistic
view is that, as users become more familiar with computers and the Internet,
they will choose dierent searching and ltering mechanisms in a functional
way, based on the task at hand. They might be happy to use a mega-portal
for one kind of content, a magazine-style site for another, and a discussion
board for some very specic interest or hobby.
Censorship and censorware
Censorship is closely related to ltering, and many of the same issues apply.
The main dierence is that with censorship someone else is deciding what
you can and cannot see. You have no choice at all in the matter. In the
United States, several attempts have already been made to regulate content
on the Internet, such as the Clipper Chip and the Communications Decency
Act, and most recently the Children's Internet Protection Act. The problem
of censorship of art and music is a familiar one, and many of same questions
of free speech carry over to the Internet.52
As is usual with the Web, the technological potential for regulation and
censorship is high. The most plausible negative scenario for free-speech
and privacy advocates is some combination of state-sponsored and market-
driven tracking and blocking. Intel, the computer chip manufacturer, had
52David Sobel, Filters and Freedom: Free Speech Perspectives on Internet Content Con-
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planned to encode unique serial numbers in its new Pentium processors
this year. The serial number could be checked by, say, e-commerce sites
to verify your identity. The controversy that followed this announcement
led Intel to reverse its decision. A somewhat similar idea from Microsoft,
involving compulsory online registration and authentication of its software,
is presently in the works. Neither of these plans is censorship as such. But
if users can be identied, then, in principle, content can be kept away from
them much more easily. The student computer networks run by universities
are an interesting testing ground for these ideas. Trac over the network
can quite easily be traced back to specic machines. The question is whether
and to what extent universities should monitor the activities of its student
users.53
Hardware-based methods of identication and authentication are likely
to encounter the most resistance from free-speech advocates. In the mean-
time, software that tries to lter content is the most popular method of
censorship. A number of companies oer services to parents who wish to
control or monitor their children's access to the Internet. Given that some
of the most protable and easily locatable sites on the internet are porno-
graphic, demand for this software is strong. \Censorware" (as it has come
to be known) is prone to two errors. Either it underblocks sites, letting
objectionable ones get through, or it overblocks, banning unobjectionable
ones. As might be expected, certain kinds of arts sites are prime candidates
for overblocking.
Censorware based on some kind of articial intelligence is hard to write,
precisely because a program needs to be able to discriminate between Web
pages on the basis of their content (i.e., their meaning), and this is a very
dicult thing to do.54 When it comes to parsing the meaning of text,
even the best software does very poorly compared to people.55 Even if the
53A. Graham Peace, \Academia, Censorship, and the Internet", Journal of Information
Ethics 6 (1997), no. 2.
54Censorware that relies on lists of site names or IP addresses does not face this problem
head on, but face their own problems because sites may have multiple names and (espe-
cially) multiple IP addresses. Even worse, they may simply have a blacklist of keywords
whose appearance on a site will cause it to be blocked, regardless of context.
55A potential solution is to provide content on the Web in a semantically rich mark-Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 26
software did a very good job, the problem in this area is not really a technical
one. Though they are much better at parsing meaning when compared to
computers, people nevertheless disagree all the time over whether this or
that text or image is obscene or not. So even if the software was as good at
discriminating and categorizing as a person, everything would still depend
on what its standards were, and this is an inescapably political problem. As
more and more cultural goods become available online, eorts to monitor
(and censor) access to books, photographs, lms and other artworks is likely
to become more common. This will be especially true for libraries and for
material made available through sites that receive any kind of public subsidy.
Archives and access
Filtering and censorship continue to be relevant when we consider the acces-
sibility of archived works in digital collections. Unsurprisingly, the explosion
of online content has created something of a crisis amongst data librarians,
archivists and curators. They face problems on at least two sides. First,
although people increasingly expect archival material to be available by dig-
ital means, it is not clear how to make this material available online easily
and eciently. Second, at least some material created solely for online con-
sumption is worth keeping. It is not clear how best to select, categorize and
store it.56
Knowledge of these topics is increasing quickly, however, and there is a
up language. Currently, html consists of metadata that describes the structure of a
document to a Web browser, marking which parts are headers, which parts are images,
where everything should go on the page, and so on. In principle, marking up Web pages in
this way can be extended to dene very general, semantic categories that the software can
process in the same way as it processes a \Headline" or \New Paragraph" tag. In this way,
your Web browser would \know" what the content of a document meant without having to
work it out via some sort of articial intelligence. Rich information about content would be
embedded in the document in a way the Web browser could parse. A working system like
this is still quite a long way o. For further discussion, see World Wide Web Consortium,
Semantic Web Activity Statement, 2001 hURL: www.w3.org/2001/sw/Activityi { visited
on April 30, 2001.
56M.K. Buckland, \What is a \document"?" Journal of the American Society for In-
formation Science 49 (1997); Mike Featherstone, \Archiving Cultures", British Journal of
Sociology 51 (2000); B. D. Case, \Love's labour's lost: The failure of traditional selection
practice in the acquisition of humanities electronic texts", Library Trends 48 (2000).Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 27
thriving industry investigating how people navigate databases and archives,
and how best to structure them.57 Professional researchers in many elds
now routinely rely on searchable full-text archive services such as ProQuest
and Lexis-Nexis. These companies have expanded the range of services they
provide as the number of Internet users (that is, potential customers) has
grown. The role the market should play in allocating access to knowledge
and culture both inside and outside of academic settings is thus an important
question. Some have worried about the potential disadvantages of having to
pay for access to primary research materials or archives of cultural materi-
als.58 In the life sciences, for example, there is a lively debate over whether
prestigious journals like Nature should charge for access to their archives.
Access to these journals is a must for serious researchers and there is strong
support for keeping scientic knowledge easily available. But editors want
subscription-based access to the archives. The issue is complex, because
there is more than one model of access and payment. Regardless of whether
access to an archive is free or not, it must still be administered by some
organization. A good deal of the con
ict comes down to who should have
control of a common research archive, regardless of the pricing model.
So there are at least two dimensions to this issue: whether this kind of
archive should be free to everyone (as the print archive is in public libraries);
and if not, who can legitimately expect to share in the prots. The question
of payments to authors does not usually arise in the case of scientic articles.
But archives of cultural goods contain material produced by authors or
artists who may want to be paid if their work is made available in this way.
The legal status of online archives like these was recently claried by the
Supreme Court in New York Times Co. vs Tasini (533 U.S. 2001). The
case resulted from the New York Times's policy of making archival material
57A.P. Bishop, \Document structure and digital libraries: how researchers mobilize
information in journal articles", Information Processing and Management 35 (1999); C.
Stephenson, \Recent developments in cultural heritage image databases: Directions for
user-centered design", Library Trends 48 (1999), no. 2.
58T.A. Callister and Nicholas C. Burbules, \Paying the Piper: The Educational
Cost of the Commercialization of the Internet", Electronic Journal of Sociology http://
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available to users on a pay-per-article basis. A group of freelance writers
argued that authors are entitled to a residual payment from the Times each
time someone downloaded one of their articles. The newspaper replied that
it had already paid its writers both for their work,and for the right to reprint
it in this context. The Times also claimed that it would be too expensive
to administer a royalty system for all of the material in its archives. Beyond
this, free access to newspapers, artworks , manuscripts and the like has
long been thought vital to preserving a common culture and an open public
sphere. Nevertheless, by a 7-2 majority, the Supreme Court held that the
freelance writers were entitled to compensation.59
The Tasini case is only one of the many fronts that the relationship be-
tween cultural goods, digital technology and intellectual property is being
decided. I discuss this issue in more detail in the next section. For now, it is
worth remembering that access to archives like these presupposes access to
the Internet in the rst place. Although the number of Americans online is
rising quickly, the existence of a \digital divide" between computer users and
non-users has been noted for some time. In the mid-1990s, it was thought
that the problem was the cost of computer hardware. But the price of an
entry-level pc has been under $500 for about three years now. Comparison
to similar goods suggests that inequality of access to communications tech-
nology is sharpest where regular bill-payments are required, as opposed to
a one-time purchase price. Thus, many more people have televisions than
telephones, and more people have televisions than have cable. For the Inter-
net, subscription services (paying your isp every month) are an additional
disincentive to many users on the wrong side of the digital divide. If they
do make it online, the pricing structure of many websites poses a further
barrier. If users must subscribe to archives, this might exclude those who
nd it dicult to aord the fee.
59The central legal issue was whether an online database constituted an alternate version
of the original (like a microlm or braille edition, for instance) or a new product. Freelance
writers are not entitled to compensation for alternate versions of the same work, but must
be compensated for new editions or products. Because online databases reproduce articles
one-by-one, rather than as a copy of the original newspaper page they appeared on, the
court ruled that it counted as a new product.Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 29
content, creativity and copyright
The problems of ltering, audience building, censorship and archiving all
concern users should (or should not) pick their way through the huge amount
of information available on the Web. But as the Tasini case shows, the
question of who owns all that content is not far behind. In this section, I
discuss some of the issues that the Internet has raised about copyright.60
The standard legal and economic justication for copyright and patent
law is that it represents a bargain between the various interests of authors
and the public. The temporary control that copyright law confers on authors
is meant to encourage their creativity in the short term and give them a
chance of getting a return on their investment. The fact that this control
eventually lapses is meant to encourage creativity in the long term, by not
privatising the common stock of culture. Copyright is not an absolute right,
either. The concept of fair use of copyrighted material allows for many
cases where a strict application of copyright would be unfair or impractical
| quoting from a book to review it, making a cassette copy of a cd for use
in the car, lending a video to a friend, playing a piece of music at a party,
and so on. The long-term purpose of copyright and patents, according to the
U.S. Constitution, is \to promote the progress of science and useful arts."
Digital technology's threat to copyright
Digital technology allows cultural goods to be copied with perfect delity
and at virtually no marginal cost. High-speed computer networks allow
those copies to be transferred between users simply and quickly. In the
techno-libertarian vision of the Internet, information wants to be free and,
in the long run, no-one can stop it. Until quite recently, it was easy to be-
lieve in this slogan, and plausible to think that, by its nature, the Internet
guaranteed that things could not be otherwise. The recent controversy sur-
rounding applications which, like Napster, allow for easy sharing of music
les, proves this idea wrong. As the radio spectrum was radically reor-
60For an excellent summary of the complex legal issues involved here, see Jessica Litman,
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ganized in the early part of the last century, so the character of the Web
might be completely changed in the next few years through a combination
of market power, legislation and case law. A small number of cases presently
working their way through the courts are likely to have lasting eects on the
architecture of the Internet. All of these cases are about the proper extent of
fair use rights and the corresponding limits of copyright; all of them concern
the regulation of cultural goods like lm and music.
We have already noted the importance to both artists and consumers of
distribution channels.61 Artists who do not get \in the pipeline" will not
be able to nd an audience. Consumers who do not use the mainstream
channels nd their search costs are higher. The owners of the various dis-
tribution pipelines are therefore in a very protable position. Napster (and
other applications like it) took advantage of the Internet to create a giant,
distributed, consumer-controlled copying and distribution center that by-
passed the conventional channels that record companies control and prot
from.62 The Recording Industry Association of America (riaa) demanded
that Napster be shut down for precisely this reason. In its public statements,
the riaa protested the service on moral grounds, calling Napster users \pi-
rates" and arguing that artists should be paid fairly for their work. A few
high-prole artists (such as the heavy-metal band Metallica) have argued
in similar terms. No-one really doubts that artists should be paid for their
work, but most commentators agree that the terms of a standard recording
contract and the size of the typical mark-up on cds makes it hard to see the
riaa as disinterested defenders of artists' rights.
There is no evidence that cd sales were negatively aected by music
trading on Napster. But the record companies did not need to prove that
they lost money, only that their copyrights were violated. Under the law
as it stands, they were. If we do not think of the prot margins of the
recording industry, or of the legions of disgruntled recording artists who
61Paul Hirsch, \Processing Fads and Fashions: an organization-set analysis of cultural-
industry systems", American Journal of Sociology 77 (1972).
62Jack Miles and Douglas McLennan, The Essential Napster, 2001 hURL: artsjournal.
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do not make it big, it is easy to appreciate the force of the riaa's view.
A cartoon repeated with numerous variations in newspapers late last year
captures the recording industry's position. It shows a father complaining to
his son, who is downloading music via Napster. \You don't know how easy
you have it," he says, \In my day, I had to shoplift the albums I wanted."
It is tempting to see the issue in this way, with exploited artists on one
side and thieving teenagers on the other. Distributors are then just trying
to help artists make an honest living. But things are not so simple. Very few
participants in this debate believe that copyright law should be scrapped or
that cultural goods should be available for free. What is at issue is how far
the reach of copyright should extend, and at what point the law no longer
acts as a bargain between artists and the public and instead becomes a way
to extract as much money from consumers as possible.
In the wake of Napster's demise, a number of other distributed le shar-
ing networks have been accumulating users. Many of these services are both
potentially more ecient than Napster at sharing les and less susceptible
to the legal problems that shut Napster down.63 At the time of writing,
neither of the two commercial mp3 sites in development by the major record
companies has been launched. It appears that the ocial sites will only oer
a subset of the each record company's catalogue. It will be interesting to see
how this limited selection aects their popularity. It may be that the biggest
long-term eect of Napster on consumer preferences will not be demand for
free music, but rather demand for complete access to the available material.
Databases that provide limited choices may well be unpopular if consumers
expect to nd everything on-line.
Copyright law's threat to culture
Napster was a sudden (and perhaps temporary) upset in a long trend towards
greater copyright control over artistic works in the U.S., a trend which itself
re
ects the continuing expansion of the scope of intellectual property at the
63These services include Gnotella, Aimster, KaZaa, LimeWire, BearShare, Gnucleus,
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expense of rst-sale and fair-use rights, and the public domain in general.64
Thanks to heavy lobbying by interested parties, Congress has lengthened
the duration of copyright eleven times in the past forty years. Similarly, in
the case of inventions and discoveries, things that people once thought could
not be patented | facts, organisms, genes, algorithms | are now routinely
registered as belonging to individuals and (more often) large corporations.65
The degree of legal copyright control is increasing, and the technical
means to monitor and enforce the new rules is improving all the time. It
seems clear that the long-term impact of these changes is bad for people
both as consumers and citizens. Consumers are more likely to be charged
on a per-use basis for goods that were once covered by rst-sale rules. Li-
censing rather than purchasing is becoming the preferred business model for
software manufacturers. Stronger copyright rules make it easier to suppress
or censor authors who parody, satirize, or even simply criticize the works of
others.66 Some software licenses, for instance, try to make it an infringe-
ment for the buyer to write a review of the software without permission.
Such restrictions potentially extend to works of ction, too. The estate of
Margaret Mitchell recently tried to prevent the publication of The Wind
Done Gone, a retelling of Gone with the Wind from the slaves' perspective.
They objected that the author's work was pirating characters they owned.67
On the Internet, companies have tried to patent 1-click shopping (Amazon),
indexing and searching the Web (AltaVista) and even the hyperlink itself
(British Telecom).
The severest critics of current copyright law see it as a tool used by
owners and manufacturers to exploit consumers and, in the long run, to
64In law, the \First-sale" doctrine is a standard exception to the exclusive right of a
copyright owner to sell a work. The copyright owner has the right to sell the work, but
not control subsequent sales. First-sale doctrine ensures that you can buy used books, for
example. \Fair use" rules dene the limits of control that a copyright holder can have over
someone who has legally purchased a copyrighted work. Whether (and to what extent) it
is legal to quote parts of a book or piece of music or make a copy of a cd to play in your
car stereo, for instance, are questions of fair use.
65Seth Shulman, Owning the future, (New York: Houghton Miin, 1999).
66Henry Jenkins, Digital Land Grab, 2000 hURL: www.technologyreview.com/i { visited
on April 30, 2001.
67Paul Starr, \Parodies Lost", The American Prospect (Forthcoming).Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 33
create a \pay-per-use" society.68 Most legal commentators agree that the
erosion of rst-sale and fair use rights is a serious problem. The two pieces
of legislation responsible for the most far-reaching changes of the last few
years are the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (ucita) and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (dmca). Ucita is a proposed state
contract law designed to standardize the licensing of software and all other
forms of digital information. It has already been passed in Delaware, and is
set to pass in Virginia. Its opponents argue that it virtually eliminates rst-
sale rights by allowing vendors to impose \shrink wrap" or \click-through"
licenses which users must agree to before they even use the product. This
law does not just aect individuals. Libraries are also strongly opposed to
ucita because its scope is very broad (covering \computer information" of
almost any kind) and because it would undermine the ability of libraries to
provide information to the public on a shared-use basis.
The dmca is a wide-ranging piece of legislation that implements several
new copyright controls. The most controversial of these is a clause that
makes it illegal to break any copy-protection scheme implemented by the
vendor. This may seem like a reasonable provision, but in fact it signicantly
changes the balance of power between vendors and consumers. Prior to the
dmca, the existence of \digital fences" such as copy-protection schemes did
not supersede the fair use rights of consumers. Consumers would be justied
in breaking down such a fence in order to exercise those rights. The dmca
makes this illegal, thereby increasing the control that vendors have over the
after-market for their products.69
This section of the dmca is currently being tested in the courts. The
case at issue concerns an encryption mechanism, called css, that is used
to copy-protect dvds. Say you have legally purchased a dvd and want to
play it on your computer, which runs the Linux operating system. In order
to do so, you need software that can decrypt the css copy protection. It
68Ronald V. Bettig, Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual Prop-
erty, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
69That is, over further exchange of a good, whether for prot or not. Laws like the
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turns out that someone has written a program, called decss that does just
this. Because Linux software is an open source operating system, you can
download the source code for this program, compile it on your computer and
then use it. Prior to the dmca, doing this would have fallen under your fair
use rights. You paid for the dvd and you should be able to watch it on the
player of your choice.70 But the new law makes the decss program an illegal
circumvention device. Using it, even for a legal purpose, is now outlawed.
Making it available for others to use is also illegal, as is even linking to a
site that makes the software available, according to a recent New York court
decision (presently under appeal).
What are the implications? First, as far as most computer scientists
are concerned, computer code is a form of speech and should therefore have
First Amendment protection. If this sounds strange, visit David Touret-
sky's gallery of css descramblers at Carnegie Mellon (http://www.cs.cmu.
edu/~dst/DeCSS/Gallery).71 As a practical as well as a conceptual matter,
the line between code and speech is not at all clear. Second, the dmca means
that vendors do not need to produce good encryption systems, because it is
illegal to circumvent them, no matter how badly designed they are. Prince-
ton University computer science professor Edward Felten recently gured
out a way to break the Secure Digital Music Initiative's (sdmi) watermark-
ing systems. But he has been unable to publish his results, because to do
so would make a circumvention device available.72 Third, it means that if
a user wants to play a dvd, she is restricted to those platforms endorsed
70There are many reasons one might want to break a copy protection for fair-use reasons.
These include, but are not limited to, (1) To convert it to another format to use on dierent
playback media, (2) To generate an archive, (3) To write your own viewer (e.g. to write a
DVD decoder that can fast-forward through advertisments), (4) To quote from a work, (5)
To make a security copy of the media. In its publicity about the decss case the mpaa has
continuously con
ated those people who use decss to watch their dvds as they choose,
with those people who physically copy dvds in order to sell them. The former can be seen
as an eort to break down a digital fence in order to exercise fair use rights. The latter is
an expensive and certainly illegal method of making money. The mpaa calls both of them
piracy.
71Providing this link constitutes a violation of the dmca under the current interpretation
of the law.
72A court case is in process at the time of writing. Felten vs riaa, CV-01-2660 (GEB).Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 35
or supported by the vendor, even if other platforms could easily play it in
principle. In short, the dmca is a supporting leg in what James Boyle calls
\the content industries' preferred trifecta: expansive intellectual property
rights, digital fences, and enforceable click-wrap licenses."73
The image of the romantic author
From a historical perspective, concepts of intellectual property and copyright
emerged slowly and somewhat precariously. The idea that authors should
be entitled to royalties on their work, that other publishers should not be
allowed to print unauthorized versions of their work, and all the other things
that we now take for granted about copyright were argued about at every
turn.74 A key image in the rise of copyright doctrine as we know it is
the \romantic author." When they discussed the concept of authorship,
Eighteenth-century theorists
...minimized the element of craftsmanship (in some instances
they simply discarded it) in favor of the element of inspiration,
and they internalized the source of that inspiration. That is, in-
spiration came to be regarded as emanating not from outside or
above, but from within the writer himself. `Inspiration' came to
be explicated in terms of original genius with the consequence
that the inspired work was made peculiarly and distinctively the
product | and the property | of the writer.75
73\Think of barbed wire. Ranchers want to use barbed wire to protect their herds,
but the wire will enclose not only their land but also portions of the commons. The
state can do three things. It can forbid the use of barbed wire. It can allow it, but also
allow others to use wire cutters to get through it, punishing them if they rustle cattle but
leaving them alone if they merely exercise their free range rights. Finally, it can make it a
free-standing tort to cut barbed wire, regardless of one's purpose, and then it can outlaw
the production of wire cutters. The content industries pick option three." James Boyle,
\Cruel, Mean or Lavish? Economic analysis, price discrimination and digital intellectual
property", Vanderbilt Law Review 53 (2000), p.2020-1.
74Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright, (Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press, 1995); Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi, eds., The Construction of
Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and Literature, (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1994).
75Martha Woodmansee, \The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and legal conditionsDigital Technology and Cultural Policy 36
This view was developed in opposition to a conception of books and
writing in which the author was only one contributer to the nal product.
An eighteenth century dictionary denes \book" in terms more reminiscent
of Howard Becker's picture of artworlds than our image of the solitary artist:
\the scholar ...the paper-maker, the type-founder and setter, the proof-
reader, the publisher and book-binder, sometimes even the gilder and brass
worker" are all \fed by this branch of manufacture."76 The elevation of the
author was a hard-fought historical process.
The actual importance (or alternatively the death) of the author is some-
thing that might be worth arguing about elsewhere, but the point here is
that this image of the author or artist as the sole creator of unique and
original works has shaped copyright law for the past two hundred years.
The image can be far removed from the reality. As James Boyle points out,
the problem is that \the tension between the rhetoric of Wordsworth and
the reality of suburban corporate capitalism is one that continues to bedevil
intellectual property discourse today."77 Corporations, and not individual
authors, hold the copyright on most cultural goods. For them, the main
promise of digital technology is the control it permits over all aspects of the
market for cultural goods.
The rhetoric of the romantic author implies that artists will starve if
people are allowed to copy their work without paying for it, in any form.
When video recorders came to the market in the 1980s, the mpaa contested
their legality in the Supreme Court. At the time, the mpaa saw only the
potential for abuse and piracy. The possibility of a huge, protable market
in video rental had not occurred to them.
The social organization of some other creative industries suggests that
creative work is not always hampered by the possibility of copying. Fashion
designers, for instance, have long taken limited patentability and low en-
forceability of copyright as a fact of life, without apparent damage to their
of the emergence of the \Author"", Eighteenth-Century Studies 17 (1984), no. 4, p.427.
76Woodmansee, Eighteenth-Century Studies 1984, ibid., p.425.
77James Boyle, Shamans, Software and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the In-
formation Society, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), p.55.Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 37
creativity or protability. My point is not that authors and artists should
assent to having their work ripped o, nor that piracy is not a real problem.
(There is no serious argument over either of these points.) Rather, it is that
there are other goods (in both the civic and the commercial sense of the
word) that need to be considered, and that experience suggests that both
new kinds of culture and new kinds of markets are best encouraged by lim-
iting the control that authors and corporations can have over existing works
and what consumers do with them. Henry Jenkins cites the example of Alice
in Wonderland, a book which largely owes its fame to the eorts of later
authors to imitate, parody or refer to it for other purposes.78 Arguments
based on the image of the romantic author refuse to acknowledge these pos-
sibilities. Organizations whose mission is to foster artistic production and
public access to art in the long term should consider the importance of the
role they would play in a world of arts consumption dominated by strong
copyright and limited fair use rights. If nothing else, with public support
and collaboration, these organizations might make inroads as competitors
in the distribution pipeline, transferring rights (and prots) back to artists
while preserving the fair use.
deciding on a future
I am not an expert on the activities of arts and cultural organizations, and I
have not tried to describe specic policies or strategies that they should be
following as they enter the digital age. Neither have I tried to act as some
kind of avatar, predicting what is around the corner for the information
society. As I have already noted, the major pitfall of futurism is that the
future will be determined, in part, by events that haven't happened yet.
Instead, I have argued that questions of cultural policy are only one aspect
of much bigger debates about the social organization of information. The
legal and political contests currently being played out will go a long way
toward deciding the sort of society we will have in ten years, and the place
cultural goods will hold in it.
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I have made a simple argument about this macro level of social change.
Digital technologies make many new things possible, but do not (by them-
selves) x the shape of the future. We already have many dierent kinds
of distribution channels, systems of content management, modes of cultural
production and so on. There is a tendency, when thinking about how these
things will change, to imagine that one particular alternative must ulti-
mately be selected (by whatever mechanism) and that this will provide the
basic organizing principle for the future. This is a mistake. It is more likely
that a variety of forms will survive, but they will become attached to dif-
ferent producers and audiences. Cars, trains and airplanes serve dierent
markets and have dierent costs and benets. These dierent transport
networks have not competed each other out of existence. Instead, the al-
ternatives are stratied partly by kinds of use and partly by kinds of users.
This still leaves the possibility that there will be a dominant mode of orga-
nization on the Internet and that culture will, in the main, be distributed or
consumed in one more or less standardized way. In
uencing the availability
of these forms of organization and regulation is one of the jobs of cultural
policy. It would be a shame, for instance, if the services that oered con-
sumers the widest real choice, or the greatest degree of interactivity, or the
most personal freedom and privacy, ended up being accessible only to the
well-o.
Each of the new arenas for cultural policy discussed in this paper has its
own peculiarities and twists. Nevertheless, they are all animated by some
basic tensions that in
uence the specic policy options available in each
case. In the next few paragraphs, I sketch some of these tensions. I present
them here as dichotomies, because they capture fundamental dierences of
principle over the Internet's architecture, purpose and content. In almost
any specic question of policy | how arts organizations should approach
getting online, the best way for nonprots to feed into emerging digital media
networks, the right way to price and license cultural goods | the choices of
policy makers will involve taking a position along these dimensions.Digital Technology and Cultural Policy 39
Open vs closed code
At the level of infrastructure, a key issue has to do with whether the code
used to run the Internet remains open or not. The transparency of code has
so far been an important reason for the rapid growth, relative openness and
interoperability of the Internet. The concept of free software was originated
by Richard Stallman at mit in the early 1980s. His main innovation was a
new kind of software license, the gpl. Under the terms of the gpl, software
and its source code were provided to the user as a package. Users were
free to modify the source however they liked (to add new features to it,
for instance), but only on the condition that they made the resulting source
code available as well. Proprietary modications are not allowed. Stallman's
aim was to promote the development of freely available software (an entire
operating system, in the long run) that could never be taken over and turned
into a proprietary product owned by a specic company.
Much of the software that runs the Internet is distributed under the
terms of the gpl or licenses similar to it.79 Sendmail (which sends email
through the Internet) and Apache (which serves the majority of the In-
ternet's Web pages) are two prominent examples. The importance of free
software in the context of cultural policy should not be underestimated. At
the most practical level, software that is free of charge is of great benet
to organizations and artists. If artists are to incorporate new technologies
in their work they must be able to aord the tools. But more deeply than
this, nonprot organizations may have a strong interest in encouraging the
development and use of software that is free to be developed further. This
is the distinction, rst made in this context by Richard Stallman, between
free as in \free beer" and free as in \free speech."80 There is evidence that
software platforms built on free software are more likely to be innovative
79Some software is produced under licenses that put it wholly in the public domain,
which allows proprietary modications to be made. More than twenty variations of \open
source" licenses exist.
80This distinction between two senses of free is a useful one. Stallman himself notes
that he con
ated the two when he came up with the idea of the gpl. Software produced
under the gpl is often free as in beer, but its real value lies in the fact that it is free as in
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and less likely to be subject to the dictates of particular companies.
Leaky systems vs tight controls
At the level of social organization, legal regulation of the Internet will decide
how much control vendors can have over how consumers use cultural goods
once they have purchased (or licensed) them, how much price discrimination
there can be, and how much users will be monitored. Open source or free
software is perfectly compatible with tight systems of watermarking, copy-
protection and so on. In the open source community, cryptographic software
has been developed to protect the privacy of individuals, but protecting the
copyright of eBooks, dvds or mp3 les is also perfectly feasible. Users might
be monitored to ensure that they do not put these goods to unauthorized
uses, for instance, or their viewing and spending habits could be tracked.
At issue is how closely we wish to regulate the use of technology, and
what the consequences of diering degrees of control might be. A world of
tight controls would allow vendors to contract with buyers in a very ne-
grained way, probably through some kind of \trusted system" which would
securely deliver the content and enforce the terms of the license at the same
time.81 Trusted systems have the ability to enforce copyright licenses on
a per-user basis, to implement precise price discrimination and to ensure
that illegal copying and distribution of software does not happen. They do
this by replacing a commons based on fair use with a myriad of individual
contracts.82
Leaky systems, in contrast, are ones where a certain degree of control is
81Mark Stek, \Shifting the Possible: How trusted systems and Digital Property Rights
challenge us to rethink digital publishing", Berkeley Technology Law Journal 12 (1997),
no. 1; M. Stek and G. Lavendel, \Libraries and digital property rights", in Research and
Advanced Technology For Digital Libraries, Vol. 1324. (1997).
82This is obviously objectionable to those who believe in fair use. In response, advocates
of trusted systems have suggested that people could be given general-purpose \fair use
licenses" that would allow them to access content (in libraries, or borrowed from others)
in a limited way dened by the law. Critics of this approach suggest that this amounts to
issuing licenses to read. Advocates reply that the market might drive vendors who issue
too-strict licenses out of business. (Though this does not seem to be happening in the
software market.) Besides, they argue, it is dicult to see how the problems of wholesale
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possible, but the regulation mechanisms stop well short of the perfect price-
discrimination and individual licensing of rights. Leaky systems make for
ineciency and also for probable infringement. They are inecient because
dierent methods of licensing or selling might require the user to do the
same thing over and over again. Think of having to have a dierent user
name and password for every computer network you log on to, or for every
Website you buy something from, for example. Or think of how, at present,
you can access one set of journals or magazines from one service, and a
dierent set from a competitor. In leaky systems, copy-protection is strong
enough for some purposes, but not so strong that vendors can control the
after-market for their products. But from a dierent perspective, leakiness
is a virtue. It makes it harder for individuals to be monitored. It preserves
rights of fair-use and rst-sale partly through its own ineciencies. It may
also be better at the long-term goal of fostering innovation and creativity.
A leaky system gives its users a kind of peripheral vision as they search for
information or browse through what's available. James Boyle captures this
eect nicely:
Most of the people who read this Article are the products
of a leaky and imperfectly controlled system, an information
ecology, in which they could get access to large quantities of
apparently irrelevant information because it was \free." They
learned that the book next to the one you are supposed to be re-
searching is always more interesting, and that the accumulation
of apparently useless information pays dividends in the long run.
What kind of preferences will be formed in the generation that
comes of age in the world of perfect price discrimination, with
the Visa card symbol always spinning in the background, and the
micro-charges always ticking? Would they spend fteen minutes
(and some number of cents) reading about Caesar's campaigns
when they were supposed to be studying cesarean sections, about
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about Manhattan?83
Interaction vs passive consumption
Finally, at the level of users, there is a tension between seeing the Internet
as an interactive environment, on the one hand, or as another prepackaged
delivery system, on the other. Again, the question is not which one will take
over the entire Web, but rather how dierent options will be stratied and
how easily they will be available to most people. Manuel Castells sees an
emerging gap between \two essentially distinct populations, the interacting
and the interacted. The former can exploit the internet fully, the latter
consume a \restricted number of prepackaged choices."84 According to this
view, the Internet will eventually become another broadcast medium, a more
sophisticated form of tv. As yet, however, it is too early to tell what the
universe of content will look like on the Internet: we do not know enough
about what users want from the media, and there are too many policy choices
yet to be made that might push the medium in one direction rather than
another.85
We should beware of confusing Castells' categories of \interacting vs
interacted" with people who know how computers work vs those who do
not. It should not be necessary for users to know very much about the
hardware and software that allows them to surf the Internet | no more
than they need to know a great deal about their car engine before they can
navigate the interstate. The problem is not getting people to understand
how computers work. Most people have no interest in learning, and if the
machines were better designed they wouldn't have to. Almost all of the
policy issues discussed in this paper persist regardless of the level of expertise
of most users. To continue the transportation analogy, think of travelling by
road vs rail in the U.S. People who travel by rail are much more restricted
in their choice of destinations and general 
exibility of travel arrangements.
83Boyle, Vanderbilt Law Review 2000, ibid., p.2033.
84Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996),
p.371.
85Though some predict that habits of passive consumption may be hard to break (Neu-
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Note that the important dierences between the two kinds of traveller does
not lie in some personal characteristic or other, such as their skill levels, their
social capital or their capacity for interaction. It does not matter if everyone
travelling by train knows an enormous amount about train timetables or
locomotive engineering. They will still not be able to travel as widely as the
people who go by road. What matters is the structure of the network itself.
This structure is established in large part through policies that encourage
one model of development over another. At the risk of overextending the
metaphor, we can say that, although it is important that people know how
to drive, this individual-level skill is only one small component of a well-
functioning transport network. Structural 
aws in the system | such as
bad connectivity, poor maintenance, too many toll-roads and the like |
will not be solved by investing in more driving lessons for road users.
conclusion
The information society did not begin with the arrival of the World Wide
Web in 1991. To say this is not to deny the Web's importance, but only to
suggest that it was not something that burst upon the world full-formed and
without precedent. In this paper, I have emphasized the importance of a
historical perspective because it helps us distinguish real social change from
hype and fashion. I have argued that, as with similar developments in the
past, a great deal of the cultural experimentation surrounding the Internet
will turn out to be ephemeral, especially that which dwells excessively on
the technology itself.
At the same time, many aspects of art and culture will almost certainly
be transformed in important and unanticipated ways. However, by deni-
tion, we cannot say in advance what those ways will be. This inevitable
uncertainty implies that the concerns of cultural policy will not change very
much on the \production side." Artists will innovate as they always have,
using and adapting the new technologies, sometimes in interesting and im-
portant ways, sometimes not. From a policy point of view, it is only neces-
sary to have an open attitude to the new media, and to treat this technologyDigital Technology and Cultural Policy 44
as at least having the potential to yield new artistic genres and important
work. As with any medium, most experiments will fail in hindsight, but
there is no point cutting o options in advance.
While policy may not change very much with regard to cultural produc-
tion, distribution and consumption may be changed beyond all recognition.
I have tried to emphasize the importance of basic choices about the archi-
tecture of the Internet, the system of property rights governing it, and the
kinds of laws regulating it. These choices will greatly eect how art and
culture are consumed, the kind of work that artists can do, and the rewards
| nancial and otherwise | that consumers, artists and nonprots will be
able to reap from the new technologies.
The arts and cultural community can help shape the evolving architec-
ture of the Internet in decisive ways. Doing so means taking a position on
some basic principles: the preservation of a public domain for a shared and
exchangeable cultural heritage; the benets of diverse cultural content that
is accessible to normal users; the centrality of free-expression and privacy
rights, and so on. It is clear from history that new technologies do not,
by themselves, decide the shape of society. The irony is that the success
of new technologies tends to obscure the choices made about them. Once
the opportunity passes, it can take a great deal of scholarly and imaginative
eort to reconstruct just what the alternative possibilities were during a
technological revolution. Constitutive choices about digital technologies are
being made now. Leaders in the arts and cultural community should make
sure that the options chosen help further their cause, before we forget that
alternative paths ever existed.
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